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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5848
This paper uses a dynamic macro-micro framework 
to evaluate the potential distributional effects of the 
expansion of the Panama Canal. The results show that 
large macroeconomic effects are only likely during the 
operations phase (2014 and onward), and income gains 
are likely to be concentrated at the top of the income 
distribution. The additional foreign exchange inflows 
during the construction and operations phases result in 
the loss of competitiveness of non-Canal sectors (Dutch 
disease) and in higher domestic prices, which hurt the 
poorest consumers. In addition, the construction and 
This paper is a product of the Latin American and Caribbean Region; and the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to 
development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. mbussolo@worldbank.org, dmedevedev@worldbank.org and rdehoyos@worldbank.org.   
operation activities increase demand for more educated 
non-farm formal workers. Although these changes 
encourage additional labor movement out of agriculture 
and from the informal to the formal sector, much of 
the impact is manifested in growing wage disparities 
and widening income inequality. Using the additional 
revenues of the Canal expansion in a targeted cash 
transfer program such as “Red de Oportunidades”, 
the Government of Panama could offset the adverse 
distributional effects and eradicate extreme poverty.   
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1. Introduction 
Within the next four years, the output capacity of the Panama Canal will roughly 
double as a new set of locks is installed, enabling ships larger than the current Panamax 
standard  to  transit  the  Canal.    Several  studies  (ACP,  2006a;  IMF,  2007)  anticipate 
significant  employment  creation  and  growth  effects  of  the  Canal  expansion  through 
increased domestic resource utilization and large multiplier effects. This view, however, 
is not consistent with the long-standing characterization of Panama as a dual economy, 
where a dynamic services exports sector has few linkages with the rest of the economy. 
More  importantly,  the  methodology  of  these  studies  cannot  provide  insights  into  the 
potential  distributional  consequences  of  the  Canal  expansion—an  aspect  of  crucial 
importance in Panama where inequality is a serious concern.  
This paper adopts a methodological framework that is focused on the likely effects of 
the Canal expansion on the distribution of income . The findings of the paper are obtained 
by linking a dynamic computational general equilibrium (CGE) model of Panama with a 
micro-simulation  framework  based  on  a  recent  Panamanian  household  survey.  The 
objective  of  the  simulations  is  to  contrast  the  counterfactual  income  distribution  that 
would  have  resulted  in  the  absence  of  the  Canal  expansion  project  with  the  income 
distribution  resulting  from  the  Canal  expansion  during  both  the  construction  and 
operation phases. Compared to earlier studies, this framework is much less suited for 
comprehensive growth analysis, especially in the near to medium term; on the other hand, 
it has the advantages of explicitly recognizing the inter-sectoral linkages in Panama‘s 
economy, clearly identifying the income sources of households, and providing a direct 
mapping  of  changes  in  macroeconomic  aggregates  to  household  welfare.  Thus,  it  is 
important to interpret the results of this paper not as forecasts, but as a consistent set of 
scenarios for the likely poverty and inequality consequences of the Canal expansion. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and presents 
some background information on Panama and the Canal shock. Section 3 summarizes the 
model  framework,  while  section  4  discusses  the  macro  and  micro  results  of  our 
simulations. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Background 
2.1.  Panama before the Canal Expansion 
Panama has been often characterized as a dual economy, consisting of a dynamic, 
high-wage export-oriented segment and a rigid, low-earning domestic-oriented segment.
1 
Service sectors dominate Panama‘s economy, accounting for 77 percent of total value 
                                                 
1 The data used in this exercise come from an updated 2003 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Panama 
as well as two Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ECV) Panama household surveys for 1997 and 2003. The 
SAM has been constructed specifically for the purposes of this paper, with particular attention devoted to 
the identification of labor and capital remuneration in both formal and informal activities (Annex 1). 
Furthermore, considerable efforts have been devoted to improving consistency between macro (SAM) and 
micro (survey) data, although a full reconciliation of the two data sources remains beyond the scope of this 
paper. The SAM data is summarized in the table presented in Annex 1, which shows the structure of final 
demand and value added at the level of SAM accounts.   3 
added and 59 percent of total exports.
2 The Canal sector is part of the dynamic, export -
oriented services sector, accounting for one -fifth of Panama‘s exports, but only for 6 
percent of total value-added and 0.5 percent of total employment. The sector operates as 
an enclave with few linkages with the rest of the economy: it exports all of its output, and 
its purchases of intermediate inputs (many of which are imported) are just 21 percent of 
its total production. Furthermore, its few workers are highly paid with average earnings 
10-20 times the national average (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Average wages by activity and skill level, 2003 (000 balboas) 
   Unskilled  Skilled 
Agriculture  1.95  4.02 
Non-agriculture  3.07  8.85 
Informal (excl. canal)  1.70  1.75 
Formal (excl. canal)  4.35  9.63 
Canal  24.94  171.93 
 
There are several other elements to the duality of the Panamanian economy. Farm 
activities account for more than 21 percent of total employment but just 8 percent of total 
value added, and farm labor market is segmented from the market for non-farm labor (see 
more details below). Similarly, informal activities (excluding agriculture) contribute just 
6 percent to total value added yet 30 percent of workers earn their wages in the informal 
sector. Imports account for less than 10 percent of total purchases of agricultural products 
and services, while more than half of all demand for manufactured goods is satisfied 
through imports. 
The same dichotomous structure is evident in the distribution of income in Panama. 
At the bottom end of the income distribution, poverty is concentrated among households 
earning their incomes from agricultural activities, and practically all of the indigenous 
households are poor (Table 2). Despite the nearly 10 percent increase in real GDP per 
capita between 1997 and 2003, the poverty profile of Panama has hardly changed: the 
headcount ratio for extreme poverty passed from a level of 18.8 percent in 1997 to a final 
value of 16.6 percent in 2003. Taking into account the 12 percent population growth over 
the entire period, just 5,500 people escaped poverty in 6 years. When poverty is defined 
using the moderate poverty line, the picture is even worse: while the headcount ratio for 
moderate poverty hardly changed between 1997 and 2003, the absolute number of poor 
increased by more than 100,000 persons. Finally, the indigenous community—already 
the poorest social group in Panama—experienced the most marked deterioration in its 
living standards as their per capita consumption actually declined relative to the 1997 
levels.   
 
                                                 
2 These and other shares reported in the text are calculated using the estimated SAM for Panama. The 
definition of service sectors excludes the Colon Free Zone but includes the Canal services.    4 
Table 2 Incidence of Poverty among the Different Population Subgroups   













1997           
Non-Agricultural Formal   970,524  2,551   32  3.8  17.7 
Non-Agricultural Informal  1,095,408  1,860   22  10.5  29.8 
Agricultural  461,532  859   4.9  40.1  70.6 
Indigenous  205,675  330   2.3  86.3  95.4 
           
Total  2,733,139  1821   21.2  18.8  37.3 
               
2003           
Non-Agricultural Formal   985,429  2631   35.3  3.7  17.7 
Non-Agricultural Informal  1,310,731  1904   25  6.7  28.7 
Agricultural  530,514  961   8  32.1  65.1 
Indigenous  236,800  310   5.7  90  98.4 
           
Total  3,063,474  1851   23.9  16.6  36.8 
* Notes: The figures are computed using the ECV (Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida) databases for years 
1997 and 2003. The unit of analysis is the household and the welfare measure is consumption per capita. 
The extreme and moderate poverty lines are equal to 533 Balboas and 953 Balboas, respectively, which 
correspond to the official poverty lines used by the government of Panama. Informality is defined as the 
employers and employees in firms with less than 6 workers that do not contribute to the social security 
system, non-professional self-employed, and household workers. A worker is classified as skilled when 
he/she completed at least one year of secondary school.    
Table 2 shows that the fastest-growing population group in Panama has been non-
agricultural informal workers (an increase of 20 percent), while the number of people 
earning  their  primary  income  from  formal  activities  hardly  changed.  Since  wages  in 
informal activities are significantly below formal earnings (Table 1), it is perhaps not 
surprising that, as the proportion of non-farm informal population rose, the incidence of 
moderate  poverty  among  non-agricultural  workers  increased  from  15.3  percent  to  20 
percent during this period. Hence the period was characterized by what Ravallion, Chen 
and Sangraula (2007) call the urbanization of poverty, with internal migration resulting in 
reductions in rural poverty, an increase in urban poverty, and little to no overall poverty 
effects. 
2.2.  The Canal expansion 
The expansion of the Canal appears to be a large ‗shock‘ for Panama, with the total 
cost of the investment project estimated to reach 5,250 million balboas (approximately 40 
percent of GDP in 2003).
3 However, the year-by-year impact of the surge in investment is 
likely to be much smaller because the construction activities will take place over a 7 year 
horizon (Figure 1). Furthermore, Panama‘s real GDP has been growing at an average 
annual rate of 8.0 percent per year between 2003 and 2010, and growth is expected to 
decelerate only slightly in the short- and medium-term. Taking into account these growth 
                                                 
3 This estimate is provided by the Panama Canal Authority in its document on the expansion of the Canal. 
The full document can be found here: http://www.pancanal.com/esp/plan/temas/plan-maestro/ .   5 
projections, the additional investment in the Panama Canal is estimated to reach just 8 
percent of GDP during the peak spending year of 2010, while the average spending over 
the entire construction period is less than 4 percent of GDP.  
At the sectoral level, the Canal expansion creates additional demand for only two 
types of activities in Panama: construction and capital goods. According to the initial 
structure of the investment demand, one additional Balboa spent of the Canal investment 
generates  64  cents  of  additional  demand  for  construction  (which  is  almost  entirely 
domestic) and 36 cents for capital goods (which are mostly imported). Although these 
sectors  generate  demand  throughout  the  economy  (the  multiplier  effect),  the  limited 
linkages of the Canal with the rest of the economy restrict the ability of the investment 
spending to energize the entire economy.  
 
Figure 1: Expenditures for the Canal expansion are spread over 2007-2014  
 
Source: Panama Canal Authority (2006) Master Plan, Chap.9 
3. A CGE-Microsimulation Model for Panama 
Given the vast differences in earnings across sectors and the semi-isolated status of 
the Canal in Panama‘s economy, this paper adopts a structural macro-micro model to 
capture  both  the  direct  and  indirect  impacts  of  the  Canal  expansion  on  the  income 
distribution.  The  expansion  directly  affects  those  who  receive  an  income  from  the 
construction and operation of the Canal, but this group represents a fairly small portion of 
the total employment and includes very few poor and no indigenous persons. Thus, the 
potential  impacts  of  the  Canal  expansion  on  the  income  distribution  are  likely  to  be 
mostly second-order, general equilibrium effects. These can be grouped into four major 
categories: a) changes in real income growth, b) changes in factor markets (employment, 
wages,  and  rental  rates),  c)  changes  in  prices  of  consumer  goods,  and  d)  use  of  the 
government receipts from the new Canal.  
The  methodological  approach  of  this  paper  can  be  best  described  as  a  two-step 
process. In the first step, a CGE model is used to create two scenarios, one with a new 
expanded  Canal  and  the  other  without.  In  the  second  step,  the  four  sets  of  general 
equilibrium  effects  identified  above  are  mapped  to  households  in  a  microsimulation 
model. This procedure  generates macro and micro counterfactuals which can then be 






























s  6 
The  approach  of  this  paper  is  based  on  ex-ante  macro-micro  simulation 
methodologies developed in the recent literature: Bourguignon, Bussolo and Pereira da 
Silva (2008) describe its advantages and drawbacks. Variants of this methodology have 
been used in various case studies, including Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva (2003), 
Ferreira and Leite (2003), Chen and Ravallion (2004), and Bussolo, Lay, and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2008). ehe present paper belongs to the long literature on welfare effects 
of large infrastructure projects. Exploiting the fact that river gradient affects a district‘s 
suitability  of  dam  construction,  Duflo  and  Pande  (2007)  find  that  such  infrastructure 
projects in India increase agricultural productivity in villages located downstream from 
the dam. Using a difference-in-difference approach, Lokshin and Yemtsov (2005) find 
that improvements in school and road infrastructure increase welfare among the poor in 
Georgia.  Using  a  variety  of  GMM  estimators  on  a  panel  data  including  over  100 
countries  covering  the  period  1960-2000,  Serven  and  Calderon  (2004)  show  that 
infrastructure development can be highly effective for poverty alleviation. Our approach 
differs from existing papers in two important ways: (1) the CGE-microsimulation model 
developed  here  allows  capturing  the  economy-wide  effects  of  the  Canal  expansion 
without losing the heterogeneous impacts on different households; (2) based on stylized 
facts, we assume that the Canal is a separate sector with only marginal linkages with the 
rest of the Panamanian economy, hence having marginal, if any, effects on total factor 
productivity.   
3.1.  Macro framework 
The CGE model used in this  paper is  the World  Bank's  prototype single-country 
model.
4 Production takes place under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, 
and is modeled in a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) fashion to reflect 
various substitution possibilities across inputs (see  Figure  2).  While the production 
nesting for the canal sector is similar to other activities, we assume that the canal uses a 
Leontief technology and employs a canal -specific capital stock.  All labor and capital 
income accrues to the households, with the exception of  capital income from publicly-
owned enterprises (e.g., the canal sector).  
The model differentiates between formal and informal production activities, with the 
latter having no access to financial markets or public services. The output of these 
activities is transformed into consumed commodities by means of a transition matrix, 
which  takes  into  account  the  fact  that  multiple  activities  can  produce  the  same 
commodity (e.g., construction services can be provided by both the formal and informal 
sectors) and that multiple commodities can be the output of a single activity (see Annex 4 
for a full listing of commodities and activities in the model). Household demand is 
allocated across commodities according to the linear expenditure system (LES), in which 
consumers  maximize a Stone-Geary utility function subject to the disposable income 
constraint.
5  Other  final  demand  agents —government  and  investment—use  the  CES 
expenditure system.  
                                                 
4 See Annex 4 for model equations. Detailed model documentation and the user‘s guide are available in van 
der Mensbrugghe (2005b) and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a), respectively. 
5 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, Chapter 3) for a detailed discussion of the LES demand system, and 
Stone (1954) for the Stone-Geary utility function.   7 
International trade is modeled using the nested Armington specification, in which 
consumer  products  are  differentiated  by  region  of  origin  and  combined  using  CES 
functions.
6  World import prices are fixed, which means that any increase in import 
demand can be satisfied without affecting global prices (small country assumption). On 
the supply side, producers allocate output to domestic and export markets the model 
according  to  a  constant  elasticity  of  transformation  (CET)  specification.  With  the 
exception of the canal sector, where Panama has monopoly power and therefore faces a 
downward-sloping  demand  curve,  the  export  price  elasticity  of  demand  is  infinite. 
Demand for canal services also responds to the growth in global trade by shifting outward 
in every time period. 
 
Figure 2 Nested structure of production 
 
 
The  aggregate  stock  of  capital  is  allocated  across  various  sectors  with  a  finite 
elasticity of transformation, resulting in imperfect mobility of capital. Skilled workers are 
freely mobile throughout the economy, while the market for unskilled labor is segmented 
into farm- and non-farm categories. Within each segment, labor is perfectly mobile across 
activities, but mobility across segments is limited by a migration function which responds 
to changes in the farm/non-farm wage premia. The initial level of migration is calibrated 
at 2 percent of the farm sector labor force, consistent with the migration levels recorded 
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in Panama over the 1997-2003 period. Although international migration is likely to be an 
important element in the dynamics of the Panamanian labor market, it is not considered 
in this analysis due to the difficulties of modeling this flow in a single-country setting. 
Labor mobility across formal and informal activities is not limited, but informal workers 
earn significantly lower salaries (on average, 20 percent of formal sector wages), giving 
rise to potentially large productivity effects when demand for one of the activity types 
rises. Finally, the model assumes no change in the degree of resource utilization, or fixed 
employment. This assumption is consistent with the available econometric evidence for 
Panama (see Galliani, 2006), which shows that the unemployment rate has been fairly 
steady at  around 6 percent  and has  not  changed much during economic upswings  or 
downturns. 
The volumes of government current and investment spending (including investments 
in the canal) are fixed as shares of real GDP, while the deficit (in real terms) is also fixed. 
Public revenues adjust to clear the government balance by means of a flexible household 
direct tax rate.
7 The investment-to-GDP ratio is fixed at the base year value and a flexible 
marginal propensity to save out of household disposable income ensures that total saving 
equals total investment. The current account balance is fixed by the available quantit y of 
foreign saving and the exchange rate is the numeraire, which means that domestic prices 
are determined relative to a fixed-cost basket of foreign goods.
8  
The model is solved in a recursive dynamic mode, in which subsequent end-of-period 
equilibria are linked with a set of equations that update the main macro variables. There 
are three determinants of real GDP growth in the model: labor supply growth, capital 
accumulation, and increases in productivity. The volumes of both types of labor grow 
exogenously at the rate of growth of the working age population (ages 15 -64), obtained 
from World Bank population forecasts. The capital stock in each period is the sum of 
depreciated capital from the period before and new investment. For all sectors, capital 
productivity  remains  fixed  throughout  the  model  horizon,  while  growth  in  labor 
productivity in the business-as-usual (BaU) scenario is calibrated to real GDP growth in 
the World Bank‘s medium- and long-term forecast for Panama.
9 In all other scenarios, 
labor productivity is fixed in each period at the BaU level, and GDP growth becomes 
endogenous.
10  Thus,  real  GDP  growth  may  differ  from  BaU  due  to  faster/slower 
accumulation of capital or shocks to the productivity shift parameters,   allowing the 
variations in GDP growth across scenarios to be directly attributed to the simulated 
policy reforms.  
 
                                                 
7 Although other assumptions about closing the government balance, such as adjustments in indirect taxes, 
increased borrowing, or reduced spending, are also plausible, choosing the direct tax rate as an instrument 
is a fairly neutral way (in an allocative sense) of restoring  fiscal balance in case of a shock. It also 
simplifies welfare measurements since the incidence of making up the budgetary shortfall falls squarely on 
consumers (in contrast to indirect taxes, which, for example, may motivate producers to allocate a larger 
share of production toward exports which may be taxed at a lower rate). 
8 We use the deflator of GDP at factor cost as a measure of movements in the real exchange rate. 
9 Labor productivity growth in the canal sector is always exogenous. 
10 Thus, in the absence of any shocks, the BaU GDP growth rate is reproduced exactly.   9 
3.2.  The micro module: linking household surveys to the 
CGE model 
The poverty and distributional effects of the Canal expansion are estimated using a 
top-down approach. The top CGE-generated prices and labor reallocation are used to 
‗shock‘ the bottom micro module so that a counterfactual income distribution can be 
estimated.  No  feedback  from  the  micro  module  to  the  macro  model  is  explicitly 
accounted for in this model. The following equations represent the core of the micro 
module:  
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o
h Y .  Welfare  effects  are 
approximated  by  changes  in  real  household  incomes  which,  in  turn,  depend  on:  1) 
changes in the prices of purchased goods (pg) and the initial share of expenditure on 
each good (
c
g h,  )
11; 2) changes in the returns to skilled and unskilled labor in the different 
labor market segments  ) ( l w  ; and 3) changes in the allocation of workers in the different 
labor market segments, i.e. agricultural and non-agricultural sectors as well as formal and 
informal activities within urban areas  ) ( ,

l h   . A new household welfare aggregate is 
computed based on the sum of the exogenous income plus the simulated labor income for 
each  member  of  the  household  given  his  or  her  skill  endowments  and  sector  of 
employment. Based on the simulated welfare aggregate, a counterfactual distribution of 
income is generated and compared with the initial distribution. 
A key issue in this modeling framework is the connection between the macro CGE 
part  and  the  micro  module  and  therefore  a  major  difficulty  consists  of  satisfactorily 
mapping the sources of incomes from the CGE model to the micro model. For example, 
in the CGE model it is possible to clearly distinguish labor remunerations from capital 
earnings;  however,  in  the  micro  data,  for  the  large  group  of  self-employed  people, 
incomes  are  a  mix  of  labor  and  capital  returns.  For  this  group,  an  imputed  wage  is 
estimated and the remaining amount is classified as capital income (see Annex 2 for 
details).  Furthermore,  the  micro-simulation  module  defines  an  exogenous  household 
income (
o
h Y )  as all non-labor income components like transfers, imputed rents, capital 
remuneration,  etc.  This  exogenous  income  is  not  modified  during  the  simulations. 
Thence, although consistency between macro and micro is always pursued, the changes 
in capital remunerations predicted by the CGE are not reflected in the micro data. The 
                                                 
11 For simplicity we only distinguish between food and non-food products.     10 
decision to treat capital remunerations as exogenous and hence losing some of the macro-
micro consistency conforms to the limitation of household surveys to capture incomes 
deriving from capital (see Szekely and Hilgert, 1999).  
A structuralist  feature introduced in  the model is  the assumption of labor market 
segmentation. Some degree of labor segmentation is allowed between agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors and, within urban areas, between formal and informal activities. 
The labor market segmentation assumption gives rise to wage differentials across labor 
market segments.
12 At the micro level workers are reallocated  among agriculture, non-
agriculture  informal,  and  formal  activities  by  means  of  a  probit  model  where  the 
probability of switching sector s  is  estimated as a fu nction of several personal  and 
household characteristics (see  Annex 3 for the complete list of variables used in the 
model and its results). Workers are allowed to switch between the different labor market 
segments until the CGE-predicted labor allocation  is achieved. For those workers who 
switch, a labor income is imputed on the bases of worker‘s observable characteristics and 
the return of them prevailing in the receiving labor market segment.     
The top-down approach used here takes into account important sources of household 
heterogeneity  such as the structure of income by labor segment and the composition of 
consumption  by  commodity—the  various  θ‘s  in  the  above  equation.  In  other  words, 
although there are only a handful of variables linking the macro and the micro, these 
shocks will have a different welfare impact across households. Additionally, allowing for 
full heterogeneity means that in the new, simulated, distribution, households, as well as 
individuals,  can  be  identified  according  to  the  complete  set  of  socio-economic 
characteristics recorded in the survey. It is thus easier to identify a specific characteristic 
– such as region of residence, employment status, gender, education, age, etc. – that may 
strongly correlate with larger than average losses from the Canal expansion and then use 
this information in targeting compensatory measures. 
4. What If Panama Expands Its Canal? Macroeconomic 
and Distributional Impacts 
This section contrasts a Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario with a Canal expansion 
scenario to assess the potential effects of the Canal expansion project on real GDP and its 
components, the real exchange rate, the labor markets, and the government budget. The 
dynamic macro-micro simulation framework used here is not a forecasting tool so the 
emphasis is mainly on the differences between the BaU and the canal expansion scenario. 
These differences tend to be robust in that they do not change much with variations in the 
assumptions and dynamic paths of the exogenous variables used in the BaU scenario. In 
other words, the value added of the modeling exercise does not consist of forecasting the 
future level of specific variables, but rather to show how those levels are ceteris paribus 
changed by the expansion and operation of the Canal. 
                                                 
12 The Chow tests for equality on the Mincer-equation parameters between agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors and  formal and  informal activities  within urban areas  were rejected at the 99 percent level of 
confidence. This is strong evidence supporting labor market segmentation.       11 
4.1.  Macroeconomic results 
Business-as-usual scenario with no Canal expansion 
The  behavior  of  macroeconomic  variables  in  the  BaU  scenario  is  summarized  in 
Table 3. The results are reported separately for two periods: 2003-2014 and 2014-2020, 
with the first period characterized by rapid growth in real income and the second period 
exhibiting a marked slowdown to a more sustainable, lower growth path.
13 In the second 
period,  exports  growth  slows  down  relative  to  imports  as  the  real  exchange  rate 
experiences a more marked appreciation. This is determined mainly by the dynamics of 
productivity growth, which drives the strong growth performance during the first period 
and slows down rapidly in the later years.
14  In the high growth period, increases in 
productivity help keep output costs down and buttress the competitiveness of Panamanian 
producers vis-à-vis foreign firms. During the transition to slower growth, smaller annual 
improvements in labor productivity imply that more workers are needed for a gi ven 
increase in output, driving up labor costs and eroding the competitiveness of Panamanian 
products versus foreign-made goods. Finally, as explained in the previous section, public 
consumption and public and private investment remain fixed as a share of  real GDP in 
every year of the BaU scenario. 
 
Table 3 Macroeconomic variables 
  
Initial 
levels  Average annual growth (%) 
  (bn lcu)  BaU  Canal 
   2003  2003-14  2014-20  2003-14  2014-20 
Real GDP at market prices  12,933  5.36  3.06  5.37  3.68 
Private consumption  8,016  5.40  3.03  5.42  3.92 
Public consumption  1,807  5.36  3.06  5.36  3.06 
Investment  2,457  4.92  2.89  5.33  3.08 
Non-canal investment  2,120  5.36  3.06  5.37  3.68 
Canal investment  87  5.36  3.06  12.86  -2.36 
Stock changes  249  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Exports   4,425  5.32  3.54  5.22  4.22 
Imports  -3,771  5.14  3.44  5.26  4.15 
Real Income per capita   3,790  3.81  2.02  3.83  2.60 
  End-of-period values (for the corresponding periods) 
Real exchange rate  1.00  1.012  1.066  1.015  1.108 
Welfare (EV)          25  1,266 
Trade-to-GDP   63.4  61.8  59.6  61.5  58.0 
           
Food CPI   1.000  1.011  1.050  1.014  1.075 
Non food CPI  1.000  1.011  1.062  1.013  1.099 
 
The evolution of factor markets matters not only for the external competitiveness of 
Panama  but  also  for  its  pattern  of  sectoral  specialization.  Several  major  trends  are 
observed in the BaU scenario and summarized in Table 4: acceleration of skilled wage 
                                                 
13 In the Canal scenario, the first period also corresponds to the construction phase and the second period to 
the operation phase. 
14 The model assumes that all technological change is Harrod-neutral, i.e. labor-augmenting.   12 
growth relative to the wages of unskilled workers, gradual reduction in farm employment, 
pronounced decline in capital rental rates during the second period, and a reduction in the 
share of formal activities during the first period followed by increased formalization in 
the second. The increasing skill premium can be largely explained by the differences in 
labor supply and labor demand. The scenarios considered in this paper do not incorporate 
increases in the average educational attainment over time, which means that the stock of 
both skilled and unskilled workers grows at the same rate as the working age population. 
On the other hand, demand for skills rises over time as Panama shifts out of unskilled-
intensive  activities  like  agriculture  and  into  more  skill-intensive  manufacturing  and 
services.
15  This transition is consistent with econometric evidence that food income 
elasticities tend to be below one; it also results in a relative increase in demand for skilled 
labor and widening of the skilled wage premium.  
 
Table 4 Factor markets 
   BaU  BaU  Canal 
  2003  2003-14  2014-20  2003-14  2014-20 
  Levels  Annual growth rates (%) 
Unskilled wage   2.70  3.51  2.1  3.57  3.3 
Non-farm unskilled wage  3.07  2.84  1.7  2.90  3.0 
Farm unskilled wage  1.95  4.91  3.3  4.96  3.9 
Skilled wage   8.68  4.28  5.7  4.33  8.2 
Formal capital real rent (index)  1.00  -0.36  -2.2  -0.35  -2.6 
Informal capital real rent (index)  1.00  0.85  -3.8  0.87  -5.8 
Canal capital real rent (index)  1.00  -0.11  -1.1  -0.20  0.3 
             
Total labor supply   1,178  1.6  1.3  1.6  1.3 
Unskilled labor  713  1.6  1.3  1.6  1.3 
Unskilled farm labor  236  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -0.5 
Unskilled non-farm labor  477  2.5  1.9  2.5  2.0 
Unskilled formal non-farm labor  217  2.2  3.2  2.3  3.5 
Unskilled informal non-farm labor  260  2.7  0.8  2.6  0.6 
Unskilled migration  5.2  -2.0  -1.6  -2.0  -0.8 
Skilled labor  465  1.6  1.3  1.6  1.3 
Skilled formal non-farm labor  365  1.7  1.8  1.7  1.8 
Skilled informal non-farm labor  84  1.3  -0.9  1.2  -1.0 
 
The structural  shift  out  of agriculture is  also  driven by falling farm employment, 
which declines at an average rate of 0.4 percentage points per year. This is consistent 
with  the  experience  of  Panama  between  1997  and  2003,  when  the  rates  of  worker 
migration to non-agriculture activities outpaced the growth rate of farm labor force. As a 
result of relative labor scarcity in agriculture, farm wages actually grow faster than non-
farm  wages  in  the  BaU  scenario,  reducing  the  non-agriculture  wage  premium  to  15 
percent in 2020 from 58 percent in 2003.  
The changes in consumer prices (reported in the bottom part of Table 3) are mainly 
determined  by  the  trends  in  agriculture  production  and  demand  for  food  products. 
                                                 
15 The contribution of agriculture to total output declines from 7.3 percent in 2003 to 6.2 percent in 2014 
and further to 5.6 percent by 2020.   13 
Between 2003 and 2014, slower-than-average growth rates of farm output and demand 
for agricultural goods offset each other, resulting in similar changes in food- and non-
food  prices.  In  the  later  period,  slower  growth  in  food  demand  outweighs  smaller 
contributions of agriculture to total supply and food CPI increases less than the CPI for 
manufactured goods and services. 
The changes in the share of formal activities and the behavior of capital rental rates 
are both linked to the slowdown in growth in the later part of the model horizon. Moving 
to a lower growth path means that the stock of capital accumulated during the period of 
high growth is too large, necessitating some shedding of capital (through accelerated 
depreciation) but also a decline in the rental rates. Since formal activities tend to be much 
more capital intensive than informal (see Annex 1), access to cheaper capital benefits the 
former more than the latter and leads the transition towards increased formalization. The 
opposite trend takes place in the early period, when formal activities find themselves at a 
cost  disadvantage  relative  to  the  informal  sector  when  the  prices  of  skill-intensive 
financial services and public administration rise faster than the economy-wide average. 
Because  public  services  are  much  more  skill-intensive  than  the  economy-wide 
average (See Annex 1) and skilled wages grow faster than unskilled wages (Table 4), 
over time the government must increase its revenue collections to be able to fulfill its 
service delivery commitments. In our scenarios, this is accomplished by a combination of 
raising direct taxes (to finance the rising recurrent costs) and increased foreign borrowing 
(to  finance  capital  projects,  including  investments  in  the  canal  sector).  As  a  result, 
disposable income per capita grows at a rate slightly slower than real GDP per capita. 
 
The Canal scenario 
In the second scenario, public investment in the Canal is accelerated according to the 
PCA  schedule  (Figure  1)  and  is  financed  by  borrowing  on  the  international  capital 
markets. During the construction phase, which takes place between 2007 and 2014, the 
yearly growth rate of the investment in the Canal more than doubles (Table 3) while 
Canal output remains the same as in the BaU scenario.
16 In the operation phase, when the 
new sets of locks come online in 2014, the output rises to twice the BaU levels.
  
In the construction phase, the growth rates of real GDP and private consumption 
barely accelerate relative to the BaU scenario. Therefore, unlike the views expressed in 
ACP (2006a) and IMF (2007), the construction of an expanded Canal has a very small 
growth impact in our model. This outcome can be explained by the following reasons. 
First, although employment demand in the construction sector goes up, new jobs in this 
sector amount to just 4% of the total unskilled employment and close to 2% of skilled 
employment even during the peak investment year of 2010.
17 The simple averages of the 
employment gains during the construction years are 0.9% and 0.4% for the unskilled and 
skilled segments respectively, which means that, despite a large increase in demand for 
construction services from the Canal project, relatively few jobs are created from the 
economy-wide perspective. More importantly, the new jobs in the construction sector are 
filled by workers leaving jobs in other sectors. Therefore, the assumption of a fix ed 
unemployment rate is the main determinant of the lack of large growth effects during the 
Canal  expansion.  This  assumption  is  consistent  with  the  documented  rigidities  in 
                                                 
16 The growth rate of Canal investment reaches almost 13 percent, up from 5.4 percent in the BaU. 
17 These percent increases include new informal construction jobs.    14 
Panama‘s labor market and the fact that employment has been very slow to rise even 
during periods of economic boom (Galliani, 2006), but is at odds with the view of ACP 
(2006a) and IMF (2007), which expect employment to rise by 2-4% percent from the 
2003 levels. 
The second reason for not observing significant growth effects of the construction 
phase in our model is the assumption that the capital stock accumulated during the Canal 
expansion cannot generate any additional income flows until construction is completed 
by  the  end  of  2014.  Therefore,  factors  endowment  in  the  first  period  of  the  canal 
expansion remains the same as in the BaU scenario and, if the canal investment does not 
generate any productivity spillovers, the only source of the marginal real income gains 
shown in Table 3 stem from re-allocation of resources into more productive sectors of the 
economy. This is indeed the case here, as Table 4 shows that demand for formal-sector 
labor—where  workers  are  paid  on  average  5  times  more  than  in  the  informal  sector 
(Table 1)—accelerates in the Canal scenario relative to the BaU.  
Even if real income growth remains largely unaffected during the construction phase, 
the  increase  in  investment  spending  can  have  other  relevant  macroeconomic 
consequences. Among these, the risk of Dutch disease effects is frequently highlighted. 
The argument is  as  follows.  In a  case where all canal  expansion-related financing is 
obtained in the form of foreign borrowing, as in the one simulated here, the larger inflows 
of foreign currency increase domestic demand, specifically investment demand for the 
expansion  of  the  Canal.  This  additional  domestic  demand  is  satisfied  by  increased 
imports  and  increased  domestic  production  of  non-tradables  (mainly  construction 
services). Import prices are unaffected by the increased demand in Panama, whereas non-
tradable prices, together with factor prices, will rise. This relative price shift results in a 
real exchange rate appreciation which in turns negatively affects exporting sectors. When 
comparing the Canal construction phase with the first period of the BaU, all these effects 
– stronger increases in factor and goods prices, faster real exchange rate appreciation, 
larger  imports,  and  decreased  exports  –  are  observed  in  the  model  results,  but  their 
magnitude is rather small.
18 In particular, while the unskilled wages accelerate in the 
Canal construction phase relative to the BaU conditions ( Table 4), the prices of food 
products (which represent a larger share of total consumption for the poor households) 
also increase faster than in the BaU ( Table 3). This makes the poverty impacts of t he 
Canal construction phase ambiguous. At the same time, although the direction in poverty 
changes is unclear from the macro results, the Canal construction project is almost 
certainly not having any direct poverty alleviation effects, and its indirect effects through 
changes in employment, factor, and goods prices are also likely to be limited.  
The impact of public spending on poverty reduction during the construction phase is 
similarly small. Due to the acceleration in growth of prices and wages in the construction 
phase (the Dutch disease described above), the cost of providing public services during 
this period rises relative to the BaU scenario. As a result, the government requires higher 
                                                 
18 The small magnitude of these effects is in turn explained by considering the limited size of the increased 
investment in the Canal and the same arguments used above in rationalizing the minor effects on GDP 
growth can be applied here. Besides, the leakages through imports are quite relevant in the Canal project 
shock: a large share of increased non-construction investments is satisfied by imports. Finally, inter-
sectoral mobility of factors, quite high in the model assumption, helps to reduce factor price inflation and 
thus also moderates rises of goods prices.    15 
direct tax revenues, which are obtained via a small increase in the household income tax 
rate.
19  This increase explains why per capita income accelerates less than real GDP 
(Table 3) during the construction phase, although the poverty impacts are likely to be 
very mild due to the small aggregate magnitude of the change.  
What about the operation phase? According to the background studies of the Panama 
Canal Authority, the expanded ca nal becomes operational in 2015. At this date in the 
simulation model, the capital stock as well as the output of the canal sector more than 
double. Current available projections indicate that there will be enough demand for the 
expanded Canal but much less is known about the price elasticity of this demand.
 20 In 
this  particular  market,  Panama  clearly  operates  in  a  monopolistic  position  which  is 
reflected by a downward sloping world demand curve for the Canal services. However, 
from one year to the next, demand also shifts outward following the increasing trend of 
global trade. Depending on the relative sizes of the price elasticity of the demand for 
canal services and the outwards shifts of this demand curve, the dynamic path of the 
canal fees will be either growing or decreasing. Statistics on the recent years show that 
Panama  has  been  able  to  raise  the  transit  fees  without  affecting  demand  (see  Latin 
Source, May 20, 2007) and the current simulation assumes that this trend continues in the 
future even with an expanded canal.  
A major consequence of the new locks coming online is the acceleration in the yearly 
growth rate of real GDP to 3.7 percent from 3.1 percent in the BaU scenario. There are 
two major reasons for faster income growth during the operation phase. The first reason 
is the now larger (Canal sector-specific) capital stock, which raises the factor endowment 
of Panama and generates new income through higher Canal capacity and increased fees. 
The second reason is a boost in total factor productivity, which occurs as workers move 
from lower-productivity (and lower-paying) occupations into the canal sector, where both 
productivity  and  wages  are  high  (Table  1).  Furthermore,  additional  income  growth 
generates more demand for manufactured goods and services (relative to agriculture) and 
encourages worker migration into non-farm occupations where productivity tends to be 
higher.  
The Canal  sector is  skill  intensive and the additional demand for skilled workers 
resulting from its expanded operation generates a significant increase in their wages (see 
Table 4). The Canal sector can afford to pay higher wages because higher wage costs are 
passed on to higher Canal fees with low or no effect on revenues. Higher skilled wages 
generate labor income  gains  which in  turn increase domestic demand  and benefit  all 
workers.
21 For these reasons, wages of unskilled workers also rise, but the rate of increase 
in the earnings of unskilled employees falls short of the acceleration in skilled wages. As 
a result, the skill premium widens from 329 percent in 2020 under the BaU conditions to 
360 percent in the same year in the Canal scenario. Even before moving to micro 
analysis, these results already indicate that the growth dividends of  the Canal operation 
                                                 
19 For example, the 2014 direct tax rate rises from 8.82 percent in the BaU to 8.85 percent in the Canal 
scenario. 
20 See Panama Canal Authority study ACP (2006a, b) and IMF (2007). 
21 Notice that workers in the Canal sector enjoy a large exogenous premium vis-à-vis the other sectors. 
Increased employment in the Canal and rising wages thus combine to produce a very significant gain of 
labor incomes for the household sector.   16 
are likely to be unequally distributed, with the larger share of the gains accruing to the 
better-off parts of the population.  
The wage pressures in the Canal operation phase push up domestic resource costs and 
are reflected in the real exchange rate appreciation shown in Table 3. Remarkably, the 
real exchange rate differential between the BaU and the Canal simulation is much higher 
in the operation phase than in the construction phase. In a way, the expanded operations 
of the Canal sector can be thought of as the discovery of a new natural resource for which 
there is an increasing world demand. The booming of the Canal service exports though 
has  some  unfavorable  effects  for  the  other  tradable  sectors.  During  this  phase,  other 
export sectors record lower growth rates, and import competing domestic sectors struggle 
against  cheaper  imports.  As  a  result,  Panama  specializes  further  in  exporting  Canal 
services.  
The additional real exchange rate appreciation and rising domestic costs of the Canal 
scenario are also evident in faster growth of consumer prices (Table 3). Although the 
prices of both food and non-food commodities accelerate relative to the BaU scenario, the 
increase in the non-food CPI is twice the increase in food prices. This is consistent with 
higher income elasticities for non-food products as well the higher skill content of non-
agricultural goods. Unlike the changes in factor returns, the trends in consumer prices are 
likely  to  attenuate  the  tendency  of  the  Canal  scenario  to  favor  richer  parts  of  the 
population because food prices (the main consumption item of the poor) increase less 
than the economy-wide CPI.  
Turning now to the government accounts, two offsetting trends take place in the canal 
operations phase. On the one hand, the faster pace of income and wage growth in the 
operations phase (relative to the BaU scenario) mean that public expenditure must rise 
significantly in order for the government to maintain the same level of public service 
delivery as in the BaU. On the other hand, a large part of the increased expenditure can 
be funded by higher canal revenues, as well as increased indirect tax collection. As a 
result, the government can increase the size of its income transfers to households by 273 
million balboas in 2020 (through decreased direct taxation). This transfer leads to a faster 
pace of growth in household disposable income and contributes to the sizable welfare 
gains  observed  in  this  scenario  (Table  3).  The  revenue  effect  also  has  potentially 
important distributional effects: while in the macro part of our model, we assume that the 
gains are distributed uniformly across all households, our micro model allows for exact 
targeting  of  any  potential  public  program  (e.g.,  similar  to  the  existing  cash  transfer 
program) that might seek to redistribute the canal revenues to the poorer parts of the 
population. 
4.2.  Distributional Impacts of the Canal Expansion 
As  described  above,  two  quite  different  periods  characterize  the  BaU  scenario. 
During 2003-2014, strong growth and minor distributional effects result in significant 
poverty reduction. Conversely, a sluggish growth combined with an increase in inequality 
lead to almost no change at all in poverty incidence between 2014 and 2020 (see Table 
5). Neither of the two periods is characterized by a strong labor reallocation: movement   17 
of workers out of agricultural activities
22 continues at a slow rate and informality in non-
farm employment stabilizes at around 40 percent.  
 
Figure 3 Growth Incidence Curves (GIC) for the Business as Usual scenario 
   
The distributional effects of the different pattern of growth of the two periods are 
graphically summarized by the growth incidence curves (GIC) shown in Figure 3.
23 In the 
BaU scenario, between 2003 and 2014 real average incomes for the median household in 
Panama will cumulatively increase by 27.5 percent. This gain is not evenly distributed: 
incomes of the bottom 10 percent of the distribution will rise only 4.3 percent on average 
compared to an increase of 32 percent experienced by h ouseholds located at the top 10 
percent of the distribution.  
An even more regressive effect is found in the BaU scenario for the second period.  
The median income increases 9.4 percent with respect to 2014, but incomes at the bottom 
10 percent of the distr ibution decrease  3.7 percent whilst incomes of the richest 10 
percent of the population rise almost 20 percent. The regressive income effect shown by 
the GICs in Figure 3 is explained by an increase in the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled  workers.  In  both  sub-periods,  real  wages  of  unskilled  workers  in  non-
agricultural sectors – the largest labor segment group – experience the slowest growth 
rate. As a result of the increase in the wage differentials, household income distribution 
deteriorates as it is indicated by the increase in the Gini coefficient reported in Table 5.  
 
                                                 
22 The CGE model does not explicitly account for rural to urban (‗geographic‘) migration of workers, but 
only for agriculture to non-agriculture (‗inter-sectoral‘) labor reallocation. Only the first type of workers‘ 
movement can be defined as internal migration and precisely linked to urbanization. However, in the main 
text, due to the high correlation (0.58) between working in non-agricultural sectors and being located in 
urban areas, the terms sectoral reallocation and urbanization are at times used interchangeably.  
23 The GIC is shows the changes in welfare along the entire inc ome distribution, therefore capturing, in a 
single  graph,  the  growth  and  distributional  components  of  overall  welfare  changes.  For  a  detailed 










































0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentiles
Vertical lines represent the % of the population under extreme and moderate poverty, respectively
GIC, 2003 - 2014 
GIC, 2014 - 2020 
   18 














           
Average Real 
Income  2,490  3,219  3,725  6  243 
             
Poverty Headcount Ratio (%)         
  Extreme  16.6  12.9  13.3  -0.07  0.0 
  Moderate  36.8  28.3  27.5  -0.08  -0.3 
             
Poverty Gap (%)           
  Extreme  6.4  5.2  5.4  0.0  0.10 
  Moderate  15.2  11.9  12.0  0.0  0.06 
             
Gini Coefficient  56.8  57.7  59.8  0.0  0.7 
* Notes: Authors‘ own estimation using data from LSMS 2003 and the results from the 
CGE-micosimulation model for Panama. The extreme and moderate poverty lines are 
equal to 533 Balboas and 953 Balboas, respectively, which correspond to the official 
poverty lines used by the government of Panama. 
 
Labor reallocation, between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and, within 
the latter, between formal and informal activities also plays a relevant role in reshaping 
income  distribution.  In  the  BaU  scenario,  the  process  of  urbanization  mentioned  in 
section  2  continues  during  the  period  2003-2020  with  the  share  of  workers  in  non-
agricultural activities increasing from 78.5 percent in 2003 to 82.7 percent in 2014 and 
finally  reaching  84.4  in  2020  (Figure  4).  Movement  of  unskilled  workers  out  of 
agricultural activities creates pressure for job creation in the non-farm, mainly urban, 
segment of the economy. If not enough formal jobs are created informality increases and 
urbanization can thus be followed by a higher incidence of poverty in the non-farm urban 
centers. This is what may happen in Panama between 2003 and 2014: although overall 
poverty  is  reducing,  by  increasing  informality,  the  process  of  urbanization  reduces 
average incomes and increases poverty among non-farm informal households. This trend 
is reversed during period 2014 – 2020 when informality is reduced from 40 percent to 36 
percent despite the continuous rural to urban migration of unskilled workers.  
The welfare effects discussed so far are those that would take place between 2003 and 
2020 in the BaU scenario. Consider now the Canal scenario. Model simulations show that 
the welfare differentials between the BaU and the Canal scenarios are negligible during 
the construction phase and rather small during the the first 6 years of the operation phase. 
The  moderate  real  income  gain  of  6  Balboas  on  average  (Table  5)  during  the 
construction phase is explained by a rise in wages and a reallocation of workers out of 
agricultural  sectors  and  into  formal  activities.  As  a  consequence  of  the  Canal 
construction, almost a thousand workers move out of agricultural sectors, and more than 
three thousand abandon informal occupations. All the movers enjoy considerable welfare 
gains; however, due to the small size of this group the overall distributional effect is 
negligible  as  demonstrated  by  no  change  in  the  Gini  coefficient  and  the  flat  growth   19 
incidence curve of Figure 5. Aggregate poverty declines marginally due to a relative 
increase in farm wages as a consequence of out-migration from the agricultural sector. 
 
Figure 4 Sectoral Reallocation: Urbanization with Few Creation of Formal Jobs 
 
The operation phase is characterized by a larger average real income gain, of about 
243 Balboas, and a noticeable increase in inequality. About ten thousand individuals (or 
0.3 percent of the population) escape moderate poverty, with 10 percent of it explained 
by labor reallocation and the rest is accounted for by the increase in wages of unskilled 
workers  in  urban  areas.  However,  the  poverty  gap  increases,  meaning  that  poorer 
individuals are negatively affected and their incomes fall further away from the poverty 
line.    
The increase in inequality during the Canal operation is underpinned by a contraction 
in real incomes of the poorest parts of the society. On the one hand, households in the left 
tail of the income distribution (mainly  rural and indigenous communities) are mostly 
detached from the dynamic formal sectors in urban areas. For these households, labor 
remuneration accounts for as little as 30 percent of total income; the remainder is made 
up  of  remittances,  government  transfers,  imputed  rents,  pensions  and  other  transfers, 
none of which directly benefit from increased output of the Canal or its related activities. 
On the other hand, with rising goods prices – as shown by the last two rows of Table 3 –
the  cost  of  a  consumption  basket  for    these  households  rises.
24  Consequently,  as 
illustrated in Figure 5, households in the left tail of the distribution (percentile 17 and 
under) suffer a real income loss of 1.3 percent relative to the BaU scenario.
25 
                                                 
24 This result should be taken with caution since  we are assuming that consumption baskets are fixed 
although prices are changing. Moreover, the household-specific price index that we are using only allows 
for differences in the shares of food to non-food expenditures between households. One would expect that 
the basket of food consumed by the poor differ substantially from the basket of food consumed by the non-
poor.  
25 Real incomes of the families under extreme poverty would increase 1 percent under the assumption that 
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Figure 5 Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) Canal Expansion vs. BaU in 2014 and 2020 
   
Figure 6 shows the distribution of changes in real incomes by population groups. This 
figure clearly illustrates that, notwithstanding the positive average change of 5 Balboas, a 
large share of people in the indigenous group experiences losses in the Canal scenario. 
This contrasts with the distribution of the gains and losses for people occupied in formal 
non-agricultural sectors (top left panel in the figure). For this latter group higher ‗density‘ 
is concentrated in the positive portion, i.e. in the gains portion, of the horizontal axis.  
 
Figure 6: Distribution of real income changes in 2020 (Canal – BaU)  
 
Note: the horizontal axis represents the percent differences between households‘ per capita incomes in 
the Canal and BaU scenarios for the year 2020.   
                                                                                                                                                 
were to compensate for the increase in prices brought about by the Canal operation, everybody would 
benefit from it. Nevertheless, the regressive effects of the Canal would remain (a discussion on 
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4.3.        Poverty Effects of Potential Redistribution Policies 
The model‘s results show that the Canal expansion will have a positive effect on 
average incomes, including government revenues. However, the distributive effects of the 
Canal expansion are adverse, not only increasing inequality but reducing welfare among 
poorest households. The unfavorable distributional effects brought about by the Canal 
expansion  could  be  offset  by  implementing  redistribution  policies  or  strengthening 
existing ones. By 2020 the government of Panama gets an extra 273 million Balboas as a 
direct result of the rise in the Canal‘s transit. To put this figure in perspective, if the 
government of Panama wanted to eliminate extreme poverty in 2003 it would have to 
transfer 104 million Balboas to the poorest families; eradicating moderate poverty would 
cost  445  million  Balboas,  therefore  the  extra  government  resources  generated  by  the 
Canal expansion are far from being trivial. In 2020 with the extension of the Canal in 
operation, eliminating extreme and moderate poverty will require a total transfer of 90 
million Balboas and 350 million Balboas, respectively.  
To  illustrate  the  poverty  effects  of  a  redistribution  program,    we  simulate  a  case 
where the entire excess revenue of the Canal (273 million Balboas) is transferred to the 
poorest  families  in  Panama.  The  transfers  are  equal  to  the  gap  between  per  capita 
household consumption and the moderate poverty line; the families are sorted from the 
poorest to the richest and the transfers follow this order and continue until the 273 million 
Balboas are fully allocated. Under this simplistic redistribution policy scenario, extreme 
poverty would be completely eliminated, and the incidence of moderate poverty would be 
reduced to 13.2 percent of the population (see Table 6). In this hypothetical redistribution 
program, the poorest 66,425 families in Panama (including 438,766 individuals or 14 
percent of the population) receive an annual transfer equal to 4,128 Balboas.  
 
Table 6: Welfare Effects After Redistributing the Canal’s Revenues 
Scenarios  Average 
Real Income 
Poverty Headcount Ratio  Gini 
Coefficient  Extreme  Moderate 
Transfer equal to the moderate poverty 
gap (no leakage)  3,842  0  13.2  56 
Transfer equal to the moderate poverty 
gap (with admin. Costs and 20%  leakage)  3,842  3.7  18  57 
 
This redistribution program is sufficient for a massive reduction in inequality of 3 
Gini  points;  nevertheless,  this  large  equalizing  effect  would  take  place  under  the 
assumption  that  the  redistribution  policy  has  no  administrative  costs  and  targeting  is 
perfect (i.e. leakage is equal to zero or, in other words, no individual among the non-poor 
group benefits from the program). A more realistic scenario would take into account 
administrative costs and some degree of leakage of resources. For instance, in Panama‘s 
pilot conditional cash transfer program, Red de Oportunidades (RdO), 5 percent of the 
program‘s total 30 million Balboas budget is expected to be spent on administrative costs. 
Even  under  a  more  realistic  scenario  which  accounts  for  an  administrative  cost  of  5 
percent of total budget and a leakage of, say, 20 percent, the resources available for 
transfer are still 204 million  Balboas, enough to alleviate most of Panama‘s poverty. 
Under this more realistic scenario, extreme poverty is almost eliminated and moderate 
poverty is reduced to 18 percent of the population (see Table 6).    22 
4.4.  Caveats and Robustness: A brief discussion 
Modeling  at  both  the  macro  and  micro  levels  the  impact  of  a  large  future 
infrastructure project such as the Panama Canal is an extremely complicated exercise. 
Although every effort has been made to embed as much realism as possible while still 
keeping model results tractable—and the resulting effort represents the best available 
methodology to date for carrying out this type of analysis—the results come with a set of 
important caveats. They should not be interpreted as forecasts but rather as ceteris paribus 
scenarios where many elements of the economy were left unchanged for tractability and 
where some simplifying assumptions were deemed necessary. 
Two key assumptions were: a) maintaining constant the composition of skills across 
scenarios, and b) full employment of factors. With regard to the former, although the 
model horizon is long enough to allow some individuals to respond to changing wage 
levels  by  investing  in  skills  building,  modeling  such  a  response  is  fraught  with 
difficulties.  First,  if  individuals  exit  the  labor  market  in  order  to  acquire  new  skills, 
growth would suffer in the interim as labor supply would decline. The decline in growth, 
however, would bring with it a fall in demand for skill-intensive products which would 
limit somewhat the pressure on skilled wages. Second, opportunities must be available to 
allow an economically significant number of persons to upgrade their skills. This would 
normally imply an expansion in the public provision of educational services and training; 
in turn, such a supply response would take time and would also have to be financed. 
Depending on the financing vehicle, this could imply higher rates of taxation or some 
crowding-out of private investment, both of which would somewhat dampen growth and 
slow  the  growth  in  skilled  wages.  Therefore,  given  the  many  additional  assumptions 
required to incorporate such a supply response, the paper does not explicitly model this 
possibility.  However,  if  a  sufficient  number  of  workers  were  able  to  upgrade  their 
skills—with limited negative spillovers for growth in the interim period—the adverse 
distributional effects described in this paper would be lessened.  
With regard to the full employment assumption,  the model could accommodate a 
solution with unemployment. However, we opted for a full employment closure because 
of the empirical evidence on the relative stability of the unemployment rate and because 
the economy of Panama has been growing (even before the construction phase) above its 
6 percent potential growth rate and thus its recent (2007-2010) 6.5 unemployment rate 
can be considered structural and insensitive to increases of demand.
26 In order to check 
how results would change, we ran a version of the CGE model where wages are fixed and 
additional demand is met with additional employment, a sort of pure multiplier model. In 
this set-up, the construction phase would create just 0.2 percent more employment (for 
both skilled and unskilled workers) when compared with  the BaU scenario.
27 Note that, 
in  this  case ,  wages  do  not  go  up,  so  there  are  incentives  for  firms  to  substitute, 
compatibly with a given technology, other inputs for labor.  As explained above, Canal 
construction generates demand for construction services but also large leakages through 
                                                 
26 For more details on potential growth and unemployment issues see IMF (2010). Note also that in this 
document IMF staff forecasts growth for Panama ―to hover around 6 percent, broadly in line with current 
potential growth‖. 
27 This percentage (0.2%)  is calculated as the percentage difference between the level of total employment 
achieved by the end of the construction phase, i.e. by 2014, and the level of employment in the BaU for the 
same year. It is thus equivalent to the cumulated (2004-1014) employment effect.    23 
imports;  so  this  small  employment  multiplier  is  not  surprising.  The  operation  phase 
generates a slightly larger effect with employment increasing, by the end of the projection 
period,  by  2.5  percent.  What  can  be  expected  of  these  quantity  changes  in  terms  of 
income distribution? Assuming that unemployed workers are in  the lower tail of the 
distribution, a reduction of unemployment may have some equalizing effect. However 
these effects will be negligible given that only a small fraction of the population (those 
escaping unemployment) benefits from increased incomes. The results reported in the 
above  sections  can  thus  be  thought  of  as  a  sort  of  upper  bound  for  the  changes  in 
inequality and poverty. In an intermediate situation, where both wages and employment 
respond to the Canal shock, employment effects would be even smaller and the wage 
effects would be somewhat muted entailing once again reduced distributional impacts.
28 
There are also additional caveats to the results presented here, many of which indicate 
directions for future research. First, our estimates are based on a structural model and 
therefore are determined to a large extent by the structure of the economy in the base 
year. Therefore, the expanded Canal is essentially a larger version of the Canal today; it 
does not develop any new linkages to the rest of the economy or generate important 
economy-wide  spillovers  (productivity  or  otherwise).  Second,  although  we  have 
attempted to link the macro and micro sides of the analysis as closely as possible, a 
number of inconsistencies remain. Our macro analysis does not capture self-consumption 
or  intra-household  transfers,  which  may  be  particularly  important  for  the  poorest 
households. Similarly, our micro analysis does not take into account changes in payments 
to capital, which are particularly relevant to the households in the top portion of the 
income distribution. Thus, our poverty and inequality  results pertain  mainly to the 
changes in returns to labor. Third, even if the unemployment rate in Panama is insensitive 
to periods of economic boom or bust, the response among under -employed may be 
significant.  Therefore,  our  analysis  may  ignore  potentially  important  employment 
creation effects through this channel. Finally, our micro analysis focuses only on first -
order effects and does not allow households to re -optimize their consumption bundle in 
response to aggregate price changes. Thus, we could be over -stating the losses incurred 
by the poorest households, since they may be able to switch to lower-cost products when 
prices of some food items rise. 
5. Conclusions 
The  Panama  Canal  is  a  major  source  of  export  revenue  for  Panama,  but  its 
contribution to value added and employment is much more limited. Using a dynamic 
macro-micro framework, this paper has argued that the proposed expansion of the Canal 
is  likely  to  have  significant  macroeconomic  effects  only  during  the  operations  phase 
(2014 and onwards), and that income gains linked to the construction and operation of the 
new Canal are likely to be concentrated in the top portion of the income distribution. 
There are three main reasons for these conclusions. First, our approach does not allow for 
any  net  employment  creation  from  investment  in  the  Canal;  this  is  consistent  with 
econometric evidence on Panama‘s labor markets but differs from the view adopted by 
several macroeconomic studies of the Canal expansion. Second, Panama may experience 
                                                 
28 Notice that inequality is driven by changes in relative wages (skilled versus unskilled). In the additional 
CGE runs performed to test robustness of the results, the skilled premia increases less than in the standard 
(full employment) closure.   24 
sizeable real exchange rate appreciation depending on the amounts of foreign borrowing 
during the construction phase and the larger revenues accruing from the expanded Canal 
service exports during the operation phase. The additional inflows of foreign currency 
result not only in the loss of competitiveness of non-Canal sectors (Dutch disease effect) 
but also in higher domestic prices which—even though the increase in non-food CPI 
outpaces the rise in food CPI—hurt the poorest consumers in the Panamanian society. 
Third,  investment  and  operation  of  the  expanded  Canal  increase  demand  for  formal 
workers  in  non-farm  activities,  particularly  those  who  have  at  least  some  secondary 
education. Although these changes encourage some additional movement of labor from 
agriculture to non-agriculture and from the informal sector to formal activities, much of 
the impact is manifested in growing wage disparities between the poor (agricultural, and 
particularly  indigenous,  workers)  and  the  relatively  well-off  (skilled  formal  sector 
workers).  
The results show that, although aggregate poverty is likely to remain unchanged as a 
result of the Canal project, income inequality and the poverty gap are likely to increase. 
In order to counteract these negative tendencies, the government could earmark some of 
the  additional  revenues  of  the  Panama  Canal  Authority  for  funding  a  targeted  cash 
transfer program. Results from an illustrative simulation show that, even allowing for 
imperfect targeting by allocating 5 percent of the revenues to administrative costs and 
another  20  percent  to  funds  leakage,  this  policy  action  could  reverse  the  adverse 
distributional impacts by almost eliminating extreme poverty and halving the moderate 
poverty headcount. 
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Canal  4.2  5.7  19.6  100.0     1  0       
Agriculture for Domestic Mkt.  3.5  3.6  0.2  1.3  12.6  17  1  3   
Agriculture for Export Mkt.  3.8  4.1  6.4  35.6  2.3  16  2  4    
Mining  1.0  1.0  0.7  13.7  51.8  0  0  2   
Manufacturing for Domestic Mkt   6.1  2.8  2.5  8.6  26.0  6  6  4  7 
Manuf. for Domestic Mkt (inf.)  0.5  0.2           3  2     7 
Manuf. for Domestic Mkt (for.)  5.7  2.5           3  4  4    
Manufacturing for Export Mkt   12.4  11.2  30.9  53.4  63.4  2  1  18  38 
Manuf. for Export Mkt (inf.)  1.6  1.1         2  0    38 
Manuf. for Export Mkt (for.)  10.8  10.1         0  0  18   
Electricity and Water  2.4  2.9  0.0  0.1  5.2  0  1  5    
Construction  7.6  4.8         7  4  4  19 
Construction (inf.)  1.2  0.8         4  1    19 
Construction (for.)  6.4  4.0         4  2  4   
Commerce and Other Services  11.1  9.2  0.9  1.8  0.0  35  34  5  28 
Commerce Oth. Services (inf.)  2.4  2.3           24  12     28 
Commerce Oth. Services (for.)  8.7  6.9           11  23  5    
Transport & Communications  8.9  9.2  22.2  53.4  12.8  5  7  9  8 
Transport Communication (inf.)  1.1  1.4         4  3    8 
Transport Communication (for.)  7.7  7.8         2  5  9   
Financial Services  26.1  28.3  16.7  13.6  3.4  3  11  41    
Public Administration  12.9  17.3           8  33  5    
                     
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  21.4  18.6            
Agriculture  7.3  7.7  6.6  19.3  8.5  33.1  3.5  7.0  0.0 
Manufacturing  19.5  15.0  34.0  37.2  53.2  8.4  6.4  21.8  45.5 
Services (incl. Construction & Canal)  73.2  77.3  59.4  17.3  4.9  58.3  89.9  69.5  54.5 
Informal Activities (excl agriculture)  6.7  5.8         36.5  18.0  0.0  100.0 
Formal Activities  86.0  86.5         30.4  78.5  93.0  0.0 
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Annex 2: Identifying Labor and Capital Remunerations 
Using Household Survey Data 
 
In household surveys, the primary source of income information, labour remunerations 
and  returns  to  capital  are  lumped  together  in  the  income  figures  reported  by  self-
employed. In many instances it is important to distinguish the proportion of personal 
income of self-employed that is accrue to the individual's labour inputs from what is 
attributable to capital. The objective of this note is to show how to identify the value 
added (VA) of capital using micro data at the personal level. 
 
Let us define the income of self-employed individuals as the sum of labour remunerations 
and  returns  to  capital: 
k l Y Y Y   .  Assume  that  A  and  B  are  two  randomly-drawn 
individuals from the population who are identical in all characteristics except for their 
occupational category. A is a wage worker and B is self-employed. Furthermore, assume 
that  self-employment  activities  require  an  investment  in  physical  capital  greater  than 
zero. Under competitive labor markets, B could earn a wage as high as the wage earned 
by A. Therefore a good proxy for the unobserved value of 
l Y  for individual B is the 
expected wage given his/her personal characteristics. Under this simple setting, income 
gaps between A and B are attributable to returns to physical capital. 
 
Define wages (w), as the sum of personal characteristics related to labor productivity (X) 




j i j i X w        , ) ln(             (1) 
 
where  ) , 0 ( ~
2   N   and  ) (earner i .  The  parameters  in  equation  (1)  can  be  use  to 
estimate the expected value of the log of labor income for self-employed workers, if and 
only if the wage equation parameters apply to out-of-sample observations. A necessary 
condition to fulfill this requirement is that the partition between wage workers and self-
employed is the outcome of a random process. In other words, workers in the wage-
earning sectors should be similar once controlling for Xj, than self-employed workers. If 
this condition is not met and wage workers are distinguished by certain unobservable 
characteristic that makes them self-select into the wage-earning sectors, j cannot be use 
to  obtain  an  estimate  of  labor  remunerations  for  the  self-employed.  A  simple 













   
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               (2) 
 
where  Z  is  a  vector  with  the  variables  determining  the  probability  of  being  a  wage 
worker;  ) (    and  ) (    represent  the  probability  and  cumulative  normal  distribution 
functions, respectively; and  ) , (
* *    are the parameters for the population regression 
model. Notice that vector Z contains all personal characteristics X plus, at least, one extra   29 
variable  (instrument)  which  is  not  related  to  wages  but,  nevertheless,  affects  the 
probability of becoming a wage worker. Our hypothesis is that the decision to whether to 
be a wage worker or an earner is a result of the agent's risk aversion. Controlling for other 
personal characteristics, more risk-averse individuals will tend to choose the earnings 
sector as the preferred option. Savings can serve as a good proxy for risk aversion; risk-
averse individuals would show higher savings rates than risk-lovers. Therefore higher 
saving rates, which proxy for higher risk aversion, should be positively related with the 
probability of being wage worker. The population parameters  ) , (
* *    can be use to 
assign the expected value of earnings for self-employed workers: 
 
    
j
j g j g
l
g X X Y E ,
* * ˆ ˆ | ) ln(         (3) 
 
where     E   is  the  expectations  operator, 
* ˆ    and 
* ˆ    are  the  population  parameters 
estimated from equation (2), and g  (self-employed). To get the expected value of labor 
income in levels, Y
l: 
 






g X Y E X Y E Y         (4) 
 
where element    2 / exp
2   is a scaling-up factor equal to  }] [exp{
*  E    ) , 0 ( ~
2   N , 
see Wooldridge, 2003,  pg. 207.
29  If 
* ˆ   and 
* ˆ   are unbiased population parameters, 















                                                 
29 If  does not follow a normal distribution, the scaling-up factor can be estimated by running a simple 
regression of wi on  )]} [ln( exp{ i w E  without an intercept and using the only estimated parameter as the 
correction factor.   30 
Annex 3: Micro-model Regression Results 
 















  lnY_lab       
Urban  0.344  0.191  0.099  0.167 
  (3.04)**  (5.55)**  -1.86  (4.13)** 
Household Head  0.317  0.306  0.237  0.261 
  (2.97)**  (9.10)**  (4.03)**  (7.17)** 
Gender  0.193  0.237  0.187  0.123 
  -0.95  (7.64)**  (3.61)**  (3.54)** 
Years of Schooling  0.011  0.058  0.114  0.008 
  -0.3  (3.95)**  (4.65)**  -0.4 
Years of Schooling Sq  0.006  0.005  -0.001  0.005 
  (2.61)**  (7.62)**  -0.53  (6.66)** 
Experience  0.088  0.080  0.085  0.066 
  (8.98)**  (25.74)**  (17.33)**  (17.57)** 
Experience Squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (7.85)**  (18.91)**  (12.95)**  (12.02)** 
Constant  5.113  5.078  4.624  6.179 
  (19.32)**  (57.91)**  (36.65)**  (50.75)** 
Observations  997  6907  2793  4114 
Adjusted R-squared  0.18  0.33  0.19  0.28 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Informal to Formal 
Activities 
Urban  -1.463  -0.324 
  (309.49)**  (64.32)** 
Household Head  0.180  -0.359 
  (31.54)**  (66.20)** 
Gender  1.197  -0.689 
  (186.35)**  (123.53)** 
Years of Schooling  -0.139  -0.041 
  (147.78)**  (40.62)** 
Experience  -0.012  -0.034 
  (24.96)**  (64.00)** 
Experience Squared  0.000  0.001 
  (23.66)**  (79.14)** 
Household Members  0.024  -0.006 
  (32.35)**  (6.62)** 
Self-employed  0.403   
  (89.11)**   
Other HH member's income  0.000   
  (16.10)**   
     
Sectoral Dummies    YES 
     
Constant  -0.354  1.830 
  (29.53)**  (140.72)** 
Observations  5762  3201 
Pseudo-R2  0.41  0.12 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Annex 4: Sectors and commodities in the Panama SAM 
 
Production Sectors  Commodities 
Formal Sectors  Informal Sectors    
Canal     Canal 
Agriculture for Domestic Mkt.     Maize 
      Rice 
      Oil Seeds 
      Swine Livestock 
      Poultry Livestock 
      Milk 
      Other Domestic Agriculture Products 
Agriculture for Export Mkt.     Other Livestock 
      Fruits 
      Fish Products 
      Shellfish 
      Other Exports Agriculture Products 
Mining     Mining Products 
Manuf. for Domestic Mkt (for.)  Manuf. for Domestic Mkt (inf.)  Meat 
      Dairy 
      Grain Products 
      Other Domestic Manufacturing 
Manuf. for Export Mkt (for.)  Manuf. for Export Mkt (inf.)  Textiles Raw Products 
      Textiles 
      Clothing 
      Leather 
      Other Export Manufacturing 
Electricity and Water     Electricity and Water 
Construction (for.)  Construction (inf.)  Construction 
Commerce Oth. Services (for.)  Commerce Oth. Services (inf.)  Commerce and Other Services 
Transport Communication (for.)  Transport Communication (inf.)  Transport Communication 
Financial Services     Financial Services 
Public Administration     Public Administration 
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Table A.4.1: Indices used in the model 
   
i  Production activities 
k  Commodities 
l  Labor skills 
ul  Unskilled labor 
sl  Skilled labor
a 
kt  Capital types 
lt  Land types 
e  Corporations 
gz  Geographic zones (rural, urban, national) 
h  Households 
f  Final demand accounts
b 
a  Armington agents
c 
r  Trading partners 
Notes:  a. The unskilled and skilled labor indices, ul and sl, are subsets of l, and their union 
composes the set indexed by l. 
  b. The standard final demand accounts are government current and capital expenditures and private 
investment. 
  c.  The  index  a  is  the  union  of  production  activities,  i,  households,  h,  and  other  final  demand 
accounts, f. 
 
Table A.4.2: Endogenous variables 
 
Production 
i ND   nd(i)  Demand for aggregate intermediate demand bundle 
i VA   va(i)  Demand for value added bundle 
i PX   px(i)  Producer price net of production tax 
i PP   pp(i)  Producer price 
j k XA ,   xa(k,j)  Intermediate demand for goods and services 
i PND   pnd(i)  Price of aggregate intermediate demand bundle 
i KL   kl(i)  Demand for capital-labor bundle 
d
i NR   rd(i)  Demand for sector-specific resource 
i PVA   pva(i)  Price of value added bundle 
i UL   usk(i)  Demand for aggregate unskilled labor bundle 
i KSK   ksk(i)  Demand for capital/skilled labor bundle 
i PKL   pkl(i)  Price of capital-labor bundle 
i SKL   skl(i)  Demand for aggregate unskilled labor bundle 
d
i KT   ktd(i)  Demand for aggregate capital bundle 
i PKSK   pksk(i)  Price pf capital/skilled labor bundle 
d
l i LV ,   ldv(i,l)  Sectoral variable demand for labor by labor type 
i PUL   pusk(i)  Price of aggregate unskilled labor bundle 
i PSKL   pskl(i)  Price of aggregate skilled labor bundle 
d
l i L ,   ld(i,l)  Sectoral total demand for labor by labor type 
i PKT   pktd(i)  Price of aggregate capital demand bundle 
d
kt i K ,   kd(i,kt)  Sectoral total demand for capital by capital type 
i XP  xp(i)  Aggregate output from activity i.   39 
 
Income distribution 
l LY   ly(l)  Aggregate net labor remuneration 
kt KY   ky(kt)  Aggregate after-tax capital income 
E
kt k TR ,   ktre(kt)  Capital income transferred to enterprises 
e CY   cy(e)  Corporate income 
c
e S   savc(e)  Corporate retained earnings 
H
e c TR ,   ctrh(e)  Corporate earnings transferred to households 
h YD   yd(h)  Disposable income net of taxes and transfers 
H
h TR   htr(h)  Aggregate transfers by households 
W
h TR   htrw(h)  Household transfers abroad 
     
Domestic demand variables 
h k XA ,   xa(k,h)  Household demand for goods and services 
h
h S   savh(h)  Household savings 
h CPI   cpi(h)  Household-specific consumer price index 
h k PAc ,   pac(k,h)  Consumer prices 
f k XAf ,   xaf(k,f)  Other domestic final demand for goods and services 
f PF   pf(f)  Other domestic final demand price deflator 
f YF   yf(f)  Other domestic final demand aggregate expenditure level 
     
Trade variables 
d
a k XD ,   xdd(k,a)  Domestic demand for domestic production 
a k XMT ,   xmt(k,a)  Domestic demand for aggregate imports 
a k PA ,   pa(k,a)  Price of Armington good 
r k tr PM , ,   pm(tr,k,r)  Domestic tariff-inclusive price of imports by region of origin 
r k tr XM , ,   xm(tr,k,r)  Import demand by region of origin and tariff regime 
a k PMT ,   pmt(k,a)  Price of imports by Armington agent 
r k PE ,   pe(k,r)  Producer price of exports by region of destination 
s
k XD   xds(k)  Domestic output sold domestically 
k XET   xet(k)  Aggregate export supply 
k X   x(k)  Aggregate output 
r k XE ,   xe(k,r)  Export supply by region of destination 
k PET   pet(k)  Price of aggregate exports 
r k ED ,   ed(k,r)  Demand for exports by region of destination 
     
Goods price equilibrium 
k PD   pd(k)  Price of domestic goods sold domestically 
r k WPE ,   wpe(k,r)  World price of exports by region of destination 
     
Macro variables   40 
GY   gy  Government revenues 
GEXP  gexp  Total government current expenditures 
g S   savg  Nominal government savings 
h    dirtxhadj  Household direct tax schedule shifter 
Invst XF   xf("invst")  Volume of private investment 
PLEV   Plev  Absorption price deflator 
CPIT   Cpit  Aggregate consumer price deflator 
     
Factor market variables 
s
gz l L ,   ls(l,gz)  Labor supply 
gz l AWAGE ,   awage(l,gz)  Expected average wage rate 
l MIGR   migr(l)  Rural to urban migration 
gz l WMIN ,   wmin(l,gz)  Minimum wage 
e
gz l W ,   ewage(l,gz)  Equilibrium wage rate 
l i NW ,   nwage(i,l)  Sector specific wage rate net of wage tax 
l i W ,   wage(i,l)  Sector specific wage rate 
s
kt TK   tks(kt)  Aggregate capital supply by type 
PK   pk  Economy-wide aggregate rate of return to capital 
s
kt i K ,   ks(i,kt)  Sectoral capital supply by type 
kt PTK   ptks(kt)  Economy-wide aggregate rate of return to capital by type 
kt i NR ,   nrent(i,kt)  Sectoral rate of return to capital by type net of tax 
kt i R ,   rent(i,kt)  Sectoral rate of return to capital by type 
     
Macroeconomic variables 
GDPMP   gdpmp  Nominal GDP at market price 
RGDPMP  rgdpmp  Real GDP at market price 
PGDPMP  pgdpmp  GDP at market price deflator 
GDPFC  gdpfc  Nominal GDP at factor cost 
RGDPFC   rgdpfc  Real GDP at factor cost 
PGDPFC   pgdpfc  GDP at factor cost deflator 
     
Growth variables 
y g   ggdp  Growth rate of real GDP 
l








   41 
Table A.4.3: Exogenous variables 
 
Growth factors 
l    gl  Economy-wide labor productivity growth 
k
kt i,    lambdak(i,kt)  Capital productivity factor 
t
lt i,    lambdat(i,lt)  Land productivity factor 
nr
i    lambdar(i)  Sector-specific factor productivity 
s K   ksup  Aggregate (normalized) capital stock 
LAND  land  Aggregate land supply 
     
Trade prices 
r k WPM ,   wpm(k,r)  World price of imports (CIF) 
r k WPE ,   wpendx(k,r)  Export price index of competitors 
ER   er  Exchange rate and model numéraire 
     
Fiscal variables 
Govnt XF   xf("govnt")  Volume of government expenditures on goods and services 
p
i    tp(i)  Production tax 
cd
a k,    tcd(k,a)  Sales tax on domestic goods 
cm
j k,    tcm(k,a)  Sales tax on import goods 
c
h k,    Hldts(k,h)  Subsidies on household consumption 
h
h    kappah(h)  Initial marginal direct tax rates 
H
h g TR ,   gtrh(h)  Transfers from government to households 
c
e    kappac(e)  Corporate tax rates 
md    imptxadj(md)  Uniform tariff adjustment factor 
m
md r k tr , , ,    tm(tr,k,r,md)  Sectoral tariffs by region of origin and tariff regime 
e
r k,    te(k,r)  Sectoral export taxes by region of destination 
xfl
l i,    txfl(i,l)  Wage tax by sector and labor type 
xfk
kt i,    txfk(i,kt)  Capital tax by sector and capital type 
sfl
l i,    tsfl(i,l)  Wage subsidy by sector and labor type 
sfk
kt i s ,    tsfk(i,kt)  Capital subsidy by sector and capital type 
 
 
 